EU Diplomacy…The Enlargement Process: Progress or Stagnation? Economic crisis…Eurozone crisis…Contin

The enlargement policy constitutes the best example of the EU’s transformative power, with the 2004 enlargement to central and Eastern Europe being a case in point...

Considering its previous successes and the possibility to promote democratic reforms in neighbouring countries, the EU remains committed to continue expanding its

membership...As pointed out by the European Council, enlargement remains a key EU policy. Despite the official rhetoric, in 2012 the EU’s enlargement policy continued to be threatened by popular disappointment, the so-called ‘enlargement fatigue’, and the eurozone crisis, as the attention of the Member States were mainly focused on how to resolve the problems in the eurozone…

The economic crisis is not only reducing the attractiveness of becoming a member of the EU, but also having a negative economic effect on the potential candidate countries and, in particular, on the Western Balkan countries, which have seen a reduction in the levels of exports to EU countries and foreign direct investment...The Union should focus on economic recovery and it should provide the necessary resources to the weak economies of the Western Balkans in order to prevent potential instability in the region…

As far as EU–Turkey relations were concerned, there was some optimism following the election of Francois Hollande as French president 5 since his predecessor, Nicolas Sarkozy, had been rather aggressive to closer EU–Turkish relations and had pressed for a veto on the opening of new negotiating chapters. Hollande’s election did not mean a U-turn, although there were some small actions aimed towards keeping Turkey’s EU membership bid alive. First, the European Commission introduced a Positive Agenda to enhance acquis harmonization in those areas where negotiations had been blocked...Furthermore, the Cypriot Presidency did not lead to a stalemate in EU–Turkey relations as had been feared by both sides...Yet, the key argumentative issues remained: the vetoes were not lifted by France, and Cyprus and Turkey continued to refuse to implement the 2004 Ankara Protocol (extending the customs union between the EU and Turkey to the new EU Member States, including Cyprus)...Turkey continued to play a basic role as a regional power and is a basic actor in the Syrian conflict and in negotiations with Iran. In the case of Syria, Turkey supported the UN–Arab League envoys and was willing to co-ordinate its position with its European partners...However, relations with the United States and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (Nato) continued to be privileged, especially as the Syrian crisis threatened to overflow across Turkey’s borders...In December, Nato agreed to deploy Patriot missiles along the Turkish border with Syria…

Related to this, EU diplomacy was also active in seeking a more unified response to settlement expansion. Catherine Ashton made clear to the Israeli government on several occasions that settlement expansion was illegal under international law and also threatened the peace process...Similarly, the EEAS, through the political reports of the EU delegations in Jerusalem, Ramallah and Tel Aviv, repeatedly criticized Israeli activities in the Occupied Territories. In 2012, progress was achieved in the drafting of a voluntary code of conduct for labels of products originating from settlement territories that could provide a better guide for EU consumers to boycott these products...Furthermore, a proposal was discussed by the ambassadors to the political and security committee to explore the possibility of denying access of violent settlers to EU territory. EU Member States sitting in the UNSC also criticized Israeli plans for new settlements in a Declaration in December 2012. These political gestures, however, seemed to have little impact on Israeli activities, especially since EU Member States continued to be unwilling to agree on sanctions against Israel or a compulsory ban of imports from settlement territories…

The EU’s neighbourhood is currently a region in which the EU’s political and economic influence has plateaued...The continuing economic difficulties of the majority of Member States’ economies and the eurozone crisis have limited the EU’s capacities for considerable political initiatives within the region. The events in the aftermath of the Arab Spring in the southern neighbourhood are unfolding with the EU apparently unable, and unwilling, to envision political and economic innovation in its response to events...The EU’s policy towards its eastern neighbours is largely dictated by the lack of political reform within the partner countries...The EaP is making modest gains in advancing relationships with the bulk of the EU’s eastern neighbours, but relationships remain vulnerable to the changes in political events on the ground as demonstrated in relations with Ukraine…

Real questions arise as to whether the EU’s capacity for soft power influence through enlargement has been expended in its ability to effect reform in the applicant states...The promise of the EEAS to deliver greater connectivity between the different strands of the EU’s external action is still largely under-demonstrated in the policy towards the EU’s neighbouring states...This is expected to remain unchanged until the EU’s internal difficulties are resolved and allow for greater political energy and financial resources to be released to greater ambitions for the neighbourhood…